Investigations in Operation:
THE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE
ROBERT K. CARt

HE PROGRAMS of most standing committees of Congress are
largely determined for them by the number, kind and importance
of bills referred to them for consideration. This has never been
true of the Un-American Activities Committee. Its change in 1945 from
a special investigating committee to a standing committee gave it a certain measure of substantive jurisdiction over a particular legislative area,"
but it has never functioned primarily as a "legislative" committee. Instead, it has been a curious congressional phenomenon-a permanent"investigating" committee. In its own legislative area, it has had little work
to perform. 2 Rather, the Committee has had to devise a program of its
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This study will be included in Prof. Carr's forthcoming book on the Un-American Activities
Committee.
x Title I of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 6o Stat. 812 (3946), defines the
powers and duties of the Committee in much the same language as the House Resolution
which gave it perinanent status in 1945. According to the Act,
"The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized
to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States
of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a
domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our
Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any
necessary remedial legislation.
"The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of
the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with
such recommendations as it deems advisable.
"For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or
any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the
United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold
such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books,
papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may
be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by
any such chairman or member."
It is not dear from this language, however, just what legislative jurisdiction the Committee was intended to have. Moreover, jurisdiction over bills dealing with espionage is clearly
granted to the House judiciary Committee.
2In the 8oth Congress, however, a subcommittee under Representative Nixon did give
consideration to the Mundt-Nixon Bill and certain other legislative proposals which had been
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own in order to keep busy. This it did in varying ways in each of the three
Congresses between 1945 and 195o. In the 79 th Congress, devising was
held at a minimum and as a result the Committee had relatively little
work to do. In the 8oth Congress, an extensive program was devised and
the Committee concerned itself with many matters of considerable significance. In the 8ist Congress, the Committee thought up a great many
things to do, and kept quite busy, but its work attracted little attention,
for in the main it was not concerned with important issues in which the
public was deeply interested.
THE CoMUTrEE's OwN VIEw OF ITSELF

The Un-American Activities Committee's own view of itself has been
marked by confusion. In part, at least, this is understandable. Insofar as
it was and is primarily an investigating committee rather than a legislative committee it has necessarily been bothered by the uncertainties and
lack of a common tradition that have always troubled all such committees.
Secondly, as a committee charged with the assignment of discovering
the extent of subversive activity it has occupied no enviable position, for
the subject matter with which it deals is exceedingly nebulous.,Nevertheless, the Committee's views of itself have been remarkably varied, and at
times some of its members have gone far afield in their conceptions of the
Committee's purposes.
Congressional investigating committees have traditionally been regarded as having three proper functions: they may seek information that
will enable Congress to legislate wisely; they may undertake to check administrative agencies, with particular respect to the enforcement of law
or the expenditure of public funds; and they may attempt to influence
public opinion. The Un-American Activities Committee has certainly
shown an interest in all of these functions-an increasing interest in the
order in which the functions are named. But always its interest in public
opinion has been paramount. The Committee has been concerned lest
the American people fail to share its understanding of the nature of subversive activity and the many forms it may take, or appreciate the seriousness of the threat offered by this activity to the "American way of life"
as seen by itself.
In addition to these three functions the Committee has tried to exercise
two others. First, it has tried in a non-statutory way to define subversive
referred to the Committee. In the 8ist Congress the Committee was responsible for the
Wood Bill which passed the House and was ultimately absorbed into the McCarran Act. But
this type of activity has never looned large in the Committee's program.
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or "un-American" activity and thereby to set the standards of American
thought and conduct with respect to orthodoxy and heresy in politics.
Second, it has tried in varying ways to take over the function of administrative or judicial agencies in the enforcement of public policy with respect
to subversive activity.
It is difficult enough to devise wise and workable statutes dealing with
such specific and traditional forms of anti-social conduct as espionage,
sabotage, sedition, and treason. But when it comes to defining by exposure
and illustration the norms of proper thought and conduct in a democratic
society, the undertaking, the results of which are almost certain to be unfortunate, becomes an almost hopeless one. To tell a committee in its
charter of authority and instructions that its concern shall be "the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the
United States" and "the diffusion within the United States of subversive
and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or
of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government
as guaranteed by our Constitution" is to give it a virtually impossible
assignment. From time to time the Committee has concerned itself with
such matters as the content of Hollywood films, the programs of radio
news commentators, and the text-books used in American schools. In
most of these instances the Committee's chief purpose has seemed to be
the establishment of patterns of American, as against un-American,
activity which would be controlling in the development of our national
life, public and private.
The Committee's efforts to usurp the functions of administrative and
judicial agencies have taken many forms, but almost always have grown
out of its desire to put the accusing finger on specific individuals whom it
deems guilty of subversive activity. 3 The investigative arm of the Com3In its Interim Report on Hearings Regarding Communist Espionage in the United
States Government, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948) (hereafter cited as Interim Report) there is an
interesting analysis of the relative roles of the FBI, the grand jury, and the Un-American
Activities Committee. It is said that "the FBI is a fact-finding and investigating agency and
not an exposure agency.... Its duties are to find and record the facts so they will be available
to police officers, law-enforcement officials, and the prosecuting agencies of Government. It is
not a vehicle for reporting to the public on the extent of nefarious activities." With respect
to the grand jury it is asserted that its methods of fact-finding involve secrecy and that it
rests with the Attorney General to determine what evidence is submitted to it, and what verdicts will be asked for. "At best, the grand jury is not a vehicle for reporting to the public
on the extent of un-American activities in a free republic." And then in a lengthy analysis of
the role of the House Committee the Report states:
"As contrasted with the FBI and the grand jury, the House Committee on Un-American
Activities has a separate and a very special responsibility. It functions to permit the greatest
court in the world-the court of American public opinion-to have an undirected, uncensored,
and unprejudiced opportunity to render a continuing verdict on all of its public officials and to
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mittee's staff has always regarded itself as a "little" FBI. Ex-FBI men
have provided part of its personnel, and its methods and interests have
been comparable to those of the FBI. Moreover, it is this kind of work
that the staff has performed most efficiently. In unearthing the details of
the disposition of Alger Hiss's Ford roadster, or of John Howard Lawson's
organizational interests and activities the staff is seen at its best.
The incongruity of a congressional committee operating as though it
were a detective agency has at times occurred even to members of the
Committee. During the last phase of the communist espionage hearings in
1948, Representative Hbert (D., La.) noted that the Committee is not
responsible for apprehending criminals; but he did think that it is "charged
with the responsibility of bringing to the attention of the proper authorities the fact that a crime has been committed. ' 4 But even this statement
shows a concern for the specific (pointing out that a crime has been committed), rather than the general (in this instance the extent and seriousness of communist infiltration of the federal service). The general may
properly be illustrated by the specific, but it is the former and not the
latter that should be the central concern of a congressional investigating
committee.
At other times the Committee has moved forward one step through the
traditional law-enforcement process and has regarded itself as having a
grand jury function. This view of its role is to be seen in certain of its public hearings where it has listened to evidence suggesting wrong-doing by
an individual-evidence usually gathered and presented to the Committee
by members of its own staff-has then given some sort of opportunity to
the suspect to explain away the evidence against him, and has subsequentevaluate the merit of many in private life who either openly associate and assist disloyal
groups or covertly operate as members or fellow travelers of such organizations. It is as
necessary to the success of this committee that it reveal its findings to the public as it is to the
success of the FBI that it conceal its operations from the public view.
"The functioning of the Communist espionage rings in Government provides a dramatically
vivid illustration of the functions of the three foregoing public institutions in their rendering
of the service they are created to perform.
"The FBI functions to find and assimilate all of the facts available to that organization and
to make them available to the prosecuting agencies of the Federal Government. The Federal
grand jury functions to consider the evidence selected from these facts by the Attorney General
and to pass judgment upon whatever verdicts it is asked to make by the Attorney General.
The House Committee on Un-American Activities functions to alert the public concerning
the existence and operation of these espionage practices, and to point up and propose the
necessary new legislation to provide our country with greater safeguards and to enable it to
protect itself against the constantly changing tactics and practices of world-wide and worlddominated communism and its American ramparts." Ibid., at 1-2.
4 Hearings Regarding Communist Espionage in the United States Government, Part Two,
8oth Cong. 2d Sess. 1,424 (1948) (cited hereafter as Communist Espionage Hearings).
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ly "indicted" or cleared him in a printed report upon the proceedings.
The grand jury analogy has actually been used by Committee members
in so many words. For example, Representative Rankin (D., Miss.) has
been fond of calling the Committee "the grand jury of America."S
Throughout the eighteen-month life of the federal grand jury (June
1947 to December 1948) that indicted Alger Hiss and eleven members of
the Communist Party hierarchy the Un-American Activities Committee
was attempting to cover much the same ground as was this grand jury.
Many of the same witnesses were heard by both groups. In December 1948,
after Whittaker Chambers had produced the pumpkin papers, competition between the two groups was particularly keen.6 Indeed, the sense
that the un-American Activities Committee was functioning as a grand
jury was so strong that in a presentment handed down in April 1949, the
7
successor grand jury directed an implied criticism against the Committee.
In December 1948 Representative Mundt (R., S.D.) protested against
the suggestion that there was anything improper in the House Committee's activity paralleling that of the grand jury and insisted that the Committee would continue its efforts to track down and punish those who had
delivered the State Department documents to Chambers.' Representative
Nixon also attempted to justify the Committee's encroachment upon the
grand jury's province by pointing out that, due to the running of the
statute of limitations, the grand jury might not be able to return any indictments and that accordingly the Committee had a "solemn responsibility" to find out who the guilty persons were. 9 However, this position
involved prejudgment of the difficulties that the grand jury might encounter, and is a rationalization that would justify unlimited encroachment by a congressional committee upon the jurisdiction of a grand jury
under almost any circumstances.
s 91 Cong. Rec. A4 4 56 ('945); 93 Cong. Rec. 1131 (1947); Communist Espionage Hearings

5376 Consult N.Y. Times § i, p. i, col. 8 (Dec. i1, 1948), and Washington Post § M, p. 5, col. 5
(Dec. 12, 1948) for reports of the conflict.
7In complaining about the large numbers of witnesses before it who refused to testify on the
grounds of self-incrimination, the grand jury said, "This, such witnesses have unquestionably
done because they have been alerted through the publicity given by other investigating bodies
to the circumstances which the grand jury must examine in secrecy.... Having seen at
firsthand the difficulties in arriving at the truth concerning espionage violations when witnesses
have been alerted by publicized charges and countercharges, the grand jury recommends that
all investigating bodies conduct their inquiries into espionage in secret." N.Y. Times § i, p. 10,
col. 4 (April 27, 1949).

8 N.Y. Times § I, p. 2, col. 5 (Dec. i,
9 Communist Espionage Hearings 1,420.

1948).
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At other times Committee members have seemingly viewed the Committee as a final court of justice sitting in judgment on individuals accused either of specific offenses against the law or of more general offenses
against the public good or safety."' It may readily be admitted that in
such statements Committee members were using the word "court" very
loosely and did not intend to suggest that they regarded themselves as a
court of law. Nonetheless, their very use of the word, in however broad a
context, reveals a tendency to think of a hearing as being primarily concerned with estabishing the guilt or innocence of particular individuals
who are charged with specific offenses.
This is not to say that because an issue has in some way been actively
brought within the jurisdiction of the judicial arm of the government,
legislative committees must be precluded from simultaneous examination
of the issue. The United States Supreme Court attempted to sanction
somewhat that position in 188o in Kilbourn v. Thompson." But the Kilbourn decision has been a much criticized one and in its more recent rulings
bearing upon congressional investigations the Court has insisted upon no
such extreme separation of functions between the courts and investigating
committees. The trouble with the Un-American Activities Committee is
that it has not only been active in the same field as has the judiciary but
that it has actually tried to usurp the judicial function, i.e., the trial and
punishment of transgressors against the law. The Committee might properly in 1948 have concerned itself with the espionage problem at the same
time as did the federal grand jury. But its concern should have been with
the broader aspects of the problem-the extent and seriousness of the
evil, the adequacy of existing statutes protecting against the evil, and the
adequacy of the record being made by administrative and judicial agencies in the enforcement of these statutes. The Committee has concerned
itself with the adequacy of existing statutes and has from time to time
made recommendations for their revision or for the enactment of new
laws. But these recommendations have seldom gone beyond the generalization stage. The Mundt-Nixon-Wood Bill is the only carefully worked
out piece of legislation ever proposed by the Committee.
Finally, there is no doubt that the Committee has concerned itself
10 During the Communist espionage hearings Representative 116bert told one witness
"you are now before the greatest open court in this country." A little later he said, "Miss
Bentley has made these charges.... Now, you have your opportunity in open court to tell
this lady that you have never seen her before ....
" Communist Espionage Hearings 846, 847.
Mundt also stated at one point that a witness had "his opportunity, in the best court of this
country, which is the court of public opinion." Ibid., at 892.
"xo3 U.S. 68 (i88o).
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with the adequacy of law-enforcement machinery. But in the communist
espionage hearings, which have been singled out as an example, this concern was not particularly helpful. A political antagonism between the
Committee and the Department of Justice was apparent from the start,
and the Committee lost no time in making a virtual declaration of war
against the Department. Subsequently, the oral statements of Committee
members and the printed passages in its reports referring to the Department of Justice were all so shrill and venomous that they had virtually
no value in providing a basis for calm, intelligent evaluation of the Departmentds efforts, successful or unsuccessful, to ferret out espionage agents
in the federal service.
PLANNING OF THE CONMITTEE'S AGENDA

At no time has any member of the Un-American Activities Committee
or of its staff seemingly had the interest or the understanding to try to
map out a systematic program of investigation or a workable scheme of
carrying out such a program. Instead the Committee has held itself in
readiness to jump this way or that depending upon day-to-day developments, upon the political atmosphere of the moment, or upon the mere
whim of the chairman or of staff members. Usually it has moved fearlessly
ahead where the persons or subjects under investigation are weak and
defenseless. Where resistance is encountered, or where the object of investigation is itself strong and influential, the Committee has avoided
undertaking any inquiry, or has suddenly ceased activity already under
way.
It is true the Committee has had its perennial interests. Staff work, in
particular, has been carried on aimlessly in certain fields such as communism in education. Although the staff has periodically considered subversive content in textbooks, the matter has never been brought to a head
in public hearings or in the publication of a formal report.
Early in i 9 4 7 the Committee's chairman, J. Parnell Thomas (R., N.J.),
announced an "eight-point" program of research and investigation for the
Committee that ranged rather widely and called for inquiries into atomic
espionage and into communist influence in the public service, in Hollywood, in labor unions, and in education; for the development of a countereducational program against subversive propaganda, and for building
up the files and staff of the Committee so that better service might be
rendered to members of Congress. But this program was little more than
a hasty listing of certain subjects that had been of perennial interest to
the Committee.
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In January 1948, in a radio speech Thomas stated that he was "recommending" a "twelve-point" program to the Committee for the coming
year. Five of the points proposed continuation of the existing investigations into communism. The other seven points proposed to investigate and
report to the public about alleged communist and communist-front activities; to initiate legislation which would break up the communist conspiracy and strengthen governmental authority to deal with espionage;
to conduct hearings on anti-racial and anti-religious propaganda; and to
hold a conference of inter-American delegates which would work out "a
hemispheric unity of purpose" in legislating against the spread of communism.12 However, many of these proposals were not carried out during
the year.

The reference to the hearings which were to look into racial and religious
prejudice is an interesting one. These hearings were to be conducted by a

subcommittee under Representative McDowell (R., Pa.). Seemingly this
is the same subcommittee to which there are scattered references as a subcommittee on fascism.' 3 There is no evidence that this subcommittee ever
functioned. Certainly it held no public hearings and it published no
reports.
When the Democrats reorganized the Committee in the 8ist Congress,
it was announced that the "eight-point" program was being abandoned.
Thereafter, the Committee remained as busy as it had ever been, but the
random character of its program of hearings and publications became
even more pronounced than it had been under the Thomas regime.
The Committee's program, whether systematic or random, has been
largely controlled by the Chairman or Acting Chairman and by the top
members of the Committee's staff. The inactivity of the Committee in
the 7 9 th Congress was seemingly Chairman Wood's doing, whereas the
spectacular activities of the Committee in the 8oth Congress were largely
stimulated by Thomas.
On the other hand, because, among other reasons, even the most vigorous members of the Committee have never given it their undivided attention, and because other congressional interests have occupied much of
their time, Committee members have always been dependent upon the
staff for guidance and suggestions. Such staff members as Ernie Adamson,
12 94 Cong. Rec. A6g (1948). There is no evidence that the Committee itself ever formally
approved this twelve-point program. However, on April 6, 1948, the Committee apparently
approved at an executive session a very similar program. This latter program also proposed
investigation of Gerald L. K. Smith and his associates, and "the state of security in Panama."
N.Y. Times § 1,p. 4, col. 7 (April 7, 1948).
'3 Consult note 22 infra.
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Robert Stripling, and Benjamin Mandel have had much to do with shaping the Committee's program through the years. These men seem always
to have been in close rapport with the Chairman and the flow of ideas has
been two-directional. Thus there is no indication that the Committee's
program has ever been the handiwork of any one person.
Two indications of the random manner in which the Committee picks
subjects for investigation are seen in its use of the "fishing expedition"
and in its sensitivity to requests for Committee activity submitted by outside organizations. The Committee's staff has engaged in a more or less
continuous checking of private organizations on the chance that now and
then one of them may be found to be engaging in subversive activity and
thus warrant the Committee's closer attention. This casting of a wide net
to catch an occasional fish was particularly evident during the 79 th Congress when Ernie Adamson was head of the Committee's staff .4
The Committee has several times indicated that it will honor any request from respectable individuals or organizations that it pursue a particular line of investigation. S When, in 1949, it requested American colleges and universities to submit lists of the textbooks and readings used
in certain courses, the excuse was offered that the Committee had been
requested to make such a survey by the National Council of the Sons of
the American Revolution and that it could not very well ignore this re,4Adamson wrote a series of letters to numerous organizations demanding that they submit various records and papers to the Committee for examination. The text of a letter addressed
to the Veterans Against Discrimination was read into the Congressional Record by Representative Ellis Patterson. The letter, dated January 29, 1946, was as follows:
"Gentlemen:
Would you please be good enough to send me a list of your officers and your managing committee?
Several of your circulars have been sent to us by citizens of your city and I note that you
refer to democracy several times. I wonder if you are sufficiently familiar with the history of
the United States to be aware that this country was not organized as a democracy and that
section 4 of article 4 of the Constitution reads in part as follows:
'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of
government.'
Is it your purpose to ask for an amendment of the Constitution or do you propose to conduct a propaganda campaign against the administration of the provisions of the Constitution?
Yours very truly,
Era

ADAmSON

Chief Counsel."
Cong. Rec. A5o8 (1946).
Xs"The committee has formulated the policy of investigating complaints received from
American citizens who have the interests of the United States foremost in their hearts and
minds .... Any organization which advocates the establishment of the fascist system of
government in the United States will be investigated by the committee upon receipt of information that such an organization does exist." H.R. Rep. No. 2233, 79 th Cong. 2d Sess. 2
(1946).
92
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quest from such an eminent and respected organization. However, the
Committee has not been consistent about honoring all such requests from
the outside. Many requests from liberal sources that alleged native fascist
groups be investigated have been totally ignored. On the other hand, it is
unlikely that any investigation has actually been undertaken solely because it was requested by an outside organization. The request for action
from the National Council of the Sons of the American Revolution was in
all likelihood little more than a convenient peg upon which Chairman
Wood decided to hang his go-ahead order, for the staff had always shown
an interest in textbooks. In the end, the Committee has done what it has
wanted to do and has refrained from doing those things it did not want
to do.
PRocEDURE IN HEARINGS

The Un-American Activities Committee in the six years of its existence
as a permanent committee has not developed a systematic body of procedures in the conduct of its hearings. This is made evident when the
Committee's practice is checked on the following points: use of open and
closed hearings; use of the full committee and of subcommittees for the
conduct of hearings; techniques used in the questioning of witnesses;
rights accorded witnesses.
In fairness to the Un-American Activities Committee it should be
pointed out that the issue of open hearings versus closed hearings in the
conduct of a legislative investigation is a perennial one that has never been
really settled. The open hearing is frequently attacked on the grounds
that if it has not been preceded by closed hearings or by careful spade
work on the part of a committee's staff it is likely to prove an aimless and
fruitless proceeding, and that it permits irresponsible witnesses to slander
innocent people by suddenly introducing their names into the testimony
without warning. For these reasons it is argued that the real search for
information by an investigating committee can most successfully be
made in closed sessions, and that public sessions, if held at all, should be
little more than carefully staged performances in which a committee gives
publicity to information which it feels the people should have. 6 On the
" In an interview with the author, William P. Rogers, chief counsel during the Soth Congress of the Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments-the "Ferguson Committee"-took this position. He laid great stress
upon the use of executive hearings to screen testimony, to prevent the publicizing of unwarranted charges, and to give a committee a chance to decide the directions in which it wants to
move. He said, for example, that when the Ferguson Committee heard Elizabeth Bentley

and William Remington in public hearings in 1948, all seven members of the subcommittee
understood and agreed upon the purposes the public hearings were to serve: providing an
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other hand, closed hearings are frequently attacked as "star chamber"
proceedings. It is argued that in such sessions witnesses are easily browbeaten and denied essential rights, and are then helpless against the later
use a committee may make of their testimony in stories "leaked" to the
7
press or in published reports.
The trouble with the Un-American Activities Committee is not so

much that it has used open hearings or closed hearings as it is that it has
used both types freely and frequently without having had any clear understanding of the proper use of either or any consistent rule as to their
use. While no record has ever been made public of the number or kind of
closed hearings conducted by the Committee, enough is known to support
the statement that it has made extensive upe of both types. Occasionally
a hearing which has been started as a dosed one has been turned into a
public session; or vice versa, the audience has been dismissed and a public
hearing turned into an executive one. 8 Again, the record of a closed
hearing has in numerous instances been made public after the passage
of time. Such developments were relatively common, for example, in 1948
during the communist espionage hearings. At one point during these
hearings, Representative Mundt, who was Acting Chairman at the moment, tried to state the Committee's policy in the following words:
It is an established policy of the House Committee on Un-American Activities that

whenever possible, and in the public interest, public business shall be conducted publicly. We have adopted the policy, therefore, of taking the public into our confidence
whenever that can be done in hearings of this type, without injury to anybody's individual character, or without injury to the public interest.19
answer to the question as to how a person like Remington, concerning whom charges of disloyalty had been lodged with the proper authorities as early as 1945, could under the President's loyalty program make progress in the government and gain a post of great responsibility.
'7 See Excerpts from Hearings Regarding Investigation of Communist Activities in Connection with the Atomic Bomb, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess. 13-15 (1948) (cited hereafter as Atomic
Espionage Hearings), for an interesting colloquy between Dr. Martin Kamen and Mr. Stripling. Dr. Kamen requested an open hearing in order to minimize the number of misquotes in
the press. Both Stripling and the Chairman (Thomas) refused to grant the request, stating
that Kamen had no right to an open hearing, and that a closed hearing would be more advantageous to the witness.
8The Committee started to hear both Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley in
executive sessions in their initial appearances but voted to open them to the public after they
were under way. As Stripling tells the story the decision to turn the Chambers hearing into a
public session was taken as casually as follows:
"[A]fter z5 minutes of [Chambers'] story one of the members interrupted.
" 'Hell,' said the member, 'why is this in executive session? This should be in the open.'"
Stripling, The Red Plot Against America 92, 100 (1949).
19 Communist Espionage Hearings 1386.
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This was a sound enough generalization but there is little evidence that
the actual choice between open and closed hearings at that time was being
made on the basis of this policy statement alone. During the August
phase of the communist espionage hearings the Committee seemingly
used the dosed hearing upon occasion for the sensible reason that it did
not quite know where it was going or what would come out of the testimony of witnesses. There was always the possibility that the BentleyChambers story of Communists in the federal service would blow up in
the Committee's face. Accordingly, it is not surprising that such a session
as the first Chambers-Hiss confrontation scene was held privately in a
New York hotel room on August 17. The transcript of this session was
made public on August 25.

When the Committee was reorganized in the 8ist Congress in 1949, it
2
was announced that greater use would be made of executive sessions. 0
The indications are that this policy has been carried out and that most of
the public hearings since i949 have either followed executive hearings in
which the ground has already been explored, or have been based upon
more careful and systematic staff studies than had been made in previous
years. On the other hand, the decision to move back and forth from executive to public sessions is still seemingly made upon occasion in rather
casual fashion.2
The Committee's use of subcommittees has been most informal, and it
is difficult to generalize about the record beyond saying that there is no

systematic or logical pattern. At no time since 1945 has a careful attempt
been made to break up the total jurisdiction of the Committee into logical segments and to create subcommittees to facilitate an across-the-board
approach to the Committee's assignment. There have been substantive
subcommittees,- which, however, were apparently created by the Chair20 Late in April r949, Chairman Wood (D., Ga.) stated: "Because of the nature of certain
phases of the espionage hearings, the committee will find it necessary to hold a large number
of executive sessions. This does not mean that the evidence will not be made public. The committee has found it necessary to hold these executive meetings in order to develop certain
leads which could not be fully developed at public hearings." N.Y. Times § 4, p. 7, col. 4

(May I, 1949).

In an interview with the author on June 27, 1949, Frank S. Tavenner, the Committee's
counsel, emphasized the desirability of using preliminary executive hearings and of making
thorough preparations before holding public hearings. He said that it was even desirable
that executive hearings should sometimes be conducted by one-man subcommittees so that
the confidential character of the testimony could be preserved.
21For example, consult x Hearings Regarding Communist Infiltration of Radiation Laboratory and Atomic Bomb Project at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif., 8ist Cong.
ist Sess. 362 (1949).
" In the 8oth Congress the Committee made use of a subcommittee on national security
under Chairman Thomas which issued the Condon report, and a subcommittee on fascism
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man of the full committee on the spur of the moment, and functioned as
ad hoc committees. At no time in its entire history has the Committee
ever listed or identified its subcommittees in a printed document.
A much more common use of subcommittees is seen in the day-by-day
conduct of the Committee's hearings, public and executive. Even the
widely publicized Hollywood hearings and the Hiss-Chambers hearings,
at least on certain days, were actually conducted by subcommittees.23
The explanation has presumably been the inability to muster a quorum (five members) of the full Committee. To avoid subsequent legal
complications in such a situation the practice has been to announce that
a hearing is being conducted by a subcommittee, which is sometimes as
small as one man, and sometimes large enough to qualify as a session of
the full Committee.24 It is fair to take the communist espionage hearings
of 1948 as a test in this respect, for certainly no hearings ever held by the
Committee attracted more interest from its members. During the two
phases of these hearings, the Committee held sessions on twenty-seven
different days.25 On only seven of these days were the hearings conducted
under Chairman McDowell which seemingly did nothing, and a subcommittee on legislation
under Chairman Nixon (R., Cal.) which conducted hearings on the Mundt-Nixon and related
bills. There are only scattered references to the McDowell Subcommittee. For example, there
is a letter in 93 Cong. Rec. A283 9 (1947), from McDowell to Representative Sabath (D., Ill.),
thanking the latter for suggestions covering the work of the subcommittee, and stating that
work had been started drafting "the various parts of a report" on fascism. No such report was
ever published. See N.Y. Times § I, p. 4, col. 3 (Jan. 12, 1948) for another reference to this
subcommittee.
23 The printed record of the communist espionage hearings suggests that the first hearings
in August and the Interim Report of August 28 were the responsibility of the full committee.
However, the volume in which the text of the December hearings was published and the Second
Report of December 31 both carry references to a "Subcommittee" consisting of six members
(all of the members of the full Committee except Thomas, Wood, and Peterson (D., Fla.))
with Mundt as Chairman. The jurisdiction of this Subcommittee is not mentioned. However,
even during the August phase of the hearings many sessions were actually conducted by subcommittees which were sometimes as small as one man.
24 In Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949), the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four
vote, upseta conviction of Christoffel for perjury before a congressional committee on the ground
that there was a lack of evidence showing the presence of a committee quorum at the time the
alleged prejury took place. The conviction had been based upon a District of Columbia perjury
statute, and the Supreme Court held that in the absence of a quorum a committee of the House
of Representatives was not a "competent tribunal" within the meaning of the language of the
statute. Even before this decision was rendered the Un-American Activities Committee was
always careful to indicate where a quorum was not present that a session was being conducted by a subcommittee. Moreover, in any contempt proceeding against a recalcitrant witness appearing before a subcommittee, the subcommittee has always carefully reported back
to the full Committee and proper action has then been taken by the latter. In United States
v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (195o), the Court by a five-to-two vote held that the government need
not prove the presence of a quorum in the prosecution for contempt of a witness of the
Un-American Activities Committee.
2" This reference is to the sessions that were public and to those executive sessions the
record of which was ultimately made public. The Committee held a number of additional
executive hearings which were never made public.
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by the Committee itself, the sessions on the other twenty days being conducted by various subcommittees. Attendance of Committee members
has always been spotty,26 and, during these particular hearings, only foiir
of the nine members of the Committee, Mundt, Nixon, McDowell, and
H~bert, were regular in their attendance.
The Un-American Activities Committee's treatment of its witnesses
has ranged widely. To begin with, it has often observed a distinction between "friendly" and "hostile" witnesses. Soon after its creation in 1938
the Dies Committee established a pattern for the contrasting treatment
of these two types of witnesses. Friendly witnesses were allowed to ramble
at length and to tell their stories in their own words. They were seldom
asked embarrassing questions, and often were asked few questions of any
type. Hostile witnesses were often denied the right to make prepared
statements or to testify informally at any length, and the Committee
quickly learned to subject them to vigorous, penetrating cross-examina7
tion.
In general the Committee has followed the traditional and sensible
plan of letting a staff member initiate the questioning of a witness and
develop the main lines of testimony which the Committee seeks from the
witness, with Committee members joining in the questioning as the hearing proceeds. But adherence to such a systematic mode of procedure has
depended upon the care with which a hearing has been prepared, upon
rapport between staff and Committee members, and upon the idiosyncrasies of particular representatives. It was always difficult to restrain
Representative Rankin so as to allow an orderly development of testimony. In the 79th Congress Rankin was often allowed to proceed at will
and he disrupted more than one hearing by his irrational and prejudiced
questioning of witnesses. In the 8oth Congress Chairman Thomas, and in
his absence such men as Mundt and Nixon, kept Rankin pretty well suppressed. But at all times the Committee has had more than its share of
incompetent and irresponsible legislators as members, and this has had a
pronounced effect upon the questioning of witnesses.
Committee and staff members alike have at times shown a good deal of
facility and cleverness in the handling of witnesses, particularly of the un26Representative Wood was present at no hearing from July 31 to December 14. Representatives Peterson and Vail (R., Ill.)
were absent a good deal of the time. Representative
Rankin was present during the first few days of the hearings but was absent during most of
the month of August and was not a member of any subcommittee except during December
when five of the twenty-seven days of hearings occurred. Chairman Thomas missed three of
the seven days of hearings by the full Committee and was present on only eight of the twenty
days of subcommittee hearings.
27For an example of the treatment of a hostile witness consult Ogden, The Dies Committee
95 (1943).
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friendly variety. But often the questioning has been of the type that
would do credit to a lawyer cross-examining a witness in a criminal case
rather than the type that elicits for a congressional investigating committee information that will enable it to cope wisely with a difficult social
problem. Here, too, the extent to which hearings have been personalized
has been a liability.
Examples of every possible type of treatment of a witness and of techniques of questioning are readily found. Monologues by witnesses, intelligent cross-examination, bitter and unfair questioning, half-hearted questioning, ineffective questioning, are all easily illustrated. The Committee
has been particularly prone to let ex-Communists indulge in monologues.
Ogden points out that when Benjamin Gitlow appeared before the Dies
Committee in 1939 "much of the testimony was merely a monologue by
the witness, punctuated by more or less innocuous questions on the part
of counsel or of members of the Committee."'18 When Louis Budenz appeared before the Committee in 1946, he was allowed to talk at great
length, and almost no effort was made by the Committee to guide him.
He was allowed to develop in great detail his thesis that there is a "conspiratorial apparatus" that lies back of the regular Communist Party organization. His testimony had the ring of sincerity and accuracy and it
unquestionably dealt with a highly significant aspect of the communist
movement. But his presentation was long-winded and disorderly, and the
Committee showed itself largely unable to direct his testimony on to topics that should have been of great interest to a congressional body anxious
to acquaint itself concerning all phases of communist organization and
tactics. The Committee has also made the mistake of allowing ex-Communists, such as Budenz, Chambers, and Bentley, to tell their stories in
piecemeal fashion, and to reveal significant bits of information as they
happened to think of them or as suited their purposes. It is perhaps using
the advantage of hindsight and demanding of members of the Un-American Activities Committee an intelligence and sophistication which few
people possessed at the time to suggest that in the period 1946-1948 the
Committee did not make the most of its opportunity to query these witnesses vigorously and systematically. The Committee was always somewhat awed by the Budenzes and Chambers and it allowed itself to be
maneuvered into the position of regarding these men as "committee witnesses" upon whom it depended substantially for the development of its
hearings concerning espionage in the public service, in atomic laboratories, and so forth. At times it was seemingly afraid to question these
28

Ibid., at 138.
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witnesses vigorously for fear that their usefulness as witnesses for the
prosecution might be impaired. Had the Committee questioned Chambers
as vigorously as it questioned Alger Hiss during the first phase of the communist espionage hearings it might well have compelled Chambers to produce the pumpkin papers months before he did, or have uncovered significant bits of information concerning espionage in the government
service that came to light only much later during the two Hiss trials.
Half-hearted or otherwise poor questioning is readily illustrated. The
questioning of Donald Hiss and Mrs. Alger Hiss in 1948 are illustrative.
The Committee had indicated great interest in hearing Mrs. Hiss and had
seemingly gone to great lengths to arrange a session at which she could
be present and testify. But when the hearing was finally held only one
member of the Committee, Nixon, was present, and his questioning was
exceedingly brief and perfunctory. The entire printed record of the hearing
29
occupies less than two pages.

The Committee's failure to press Hiss and other witnesses for information pertaining to Hiss's actual record as a State Department official
would also seem to illustrate poor questioning. This policy may have been
deliberate, i.e., the Committee may have been afraid that it would discover no evidence of wrong-doing by Hiss as a public servant and that
such a line of questioning might boomerang in his favor. Or it may have
felt that as an alleged espionage agent Hiss would have been careful not to
let his communist sympathies affect his day-to-day work so that as a man
above suspicion he could function more effectively as an espionage agent.
But such explanations are not quite adequate. The espionage angle did not
loom large until the December phase of the hearings. At first the Chambers testimony merely stressed the idea that Hiss was a Communist who
had risen to a high post in the government. Moreover, as a staff member
of the United States delegation to the Yalta Conference, as Secretary
General of the San Francisco Conference, and as chief of the State Department Office of Special Political Affairs, Alger Hiss offered a splendid
target for questioning concerning the substance of his ideas and his policies. The Committee's relative lack of interest in developing this line of
questioning is not easily explained.3°
29 Communist Espionage Hearings 930-33, 942-43, 95s. Nixon later admitted to the
author that persistent questioning of Mrs. Hiss at this point might have elicited significant
testimony from her. As it was, Mrs. Hiss was exceedingly vague, could remember almost
nothing, and Nixon apparently gave up questioning her as a bad job almost at once.

30 There were exceptions. At one point, Representative Mundt asked a series of questions
which obtained from Hiss the information that he had helped draft portions of the Yalta
agreement, that he had opposed the idea of giving three votes to the Soviet Union in the
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Again, the questioning of the hostile witnesses during the Hollywood
hearings does not impress one has having been shrewd or intelligent. The
Committee allowed the witnesses to set the tone of the proceedings,
matched their truculence and emotionalism, and by pressing the question
concerning membership in the Communist Party, seemed content to let
them refuse to answer questions and to run the risk of punishment for
contempt, when a more clever approach might have encouraged them to
be more articulate on points of real significance to the subject under examination. For example, a sophisticated attempt to question Albert M alt2
concerning an article in The New Masses, in which he counselled tolerance
toward writers of the non-communist left, and a subsequent article recanting this view, might well have been a better approach from the point
of view of informing the American people of the danger of allowing motion
picture scripts to be written by persons who have submitted to the intellectual slavery imposed by allegiance to communism, than the course
actually followed. At times, even the goal of contempt citations was endangered, for the questioning got out of hand to such an extent that the
Committee seemed to be forgetting the necessity of establishing a clear
factual showing that the witnesses were refusing to answer pertinent
questions.
There has been continuous controversy over the issue of the rights to be
enjoyed by persons appearing before the Committee. In part, this controversy reflects the absence of an established pattern for the conduct of
hearings by congressional committees generally. Moreover, many of the
specific criticisms directed against the Un-American Activities Committee
could almost as easily have been made against virtually every investigating committee which has dealt with controversial subject matter. There
has been a tendency to take all such committees to task for their failure
to grant to witnesses the procedural rights which are customarily extended
in the criminal courts. The need for procedural reform in the conduct of
congressional investigations is undeniable. But the fact remains that up
to the present there has been no general agreement as to the rights that a
congressional committee should extend to its witnesses and few if any
specific committees have ever gone so far as to grant their witnesses the
same status they would enjoy in a courtroom.*
Nonetheless, the Un-American Activities Committee has had more than
United Nations General Assembly, that he had had nothing to do with the formulation of the
State Department China policy in x945, and that he had played a part in determining the veto
provision of the United Nations charter. Communist Espionage Hearings 657.
* Consult Galloway, Proposed Reforms, page 478 supra.
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its share of difficulty over procedural issues and this almost certainly reflects an unusual degree of carelessness or irresponsibility on the part of
the Committee. It is perhaps unfair to lay too much stress upon the remark made by Chairman Thomas in an unguarded moment when he told
an obstreperous lawyer who was serving a witness before the Committee
as counsel: "The rights you have are the rights given you by this committee. We will determine what rights you have and what rights you have
not got before the committee."''3 And yet Thomas' angry remark is not
too far away from the truth, at least with respect to the particular Committee which he headed. In The Red Plot Against America, Stripling
recognizes that upon occasion the Committee with which he was identified used vigorous methods in the treatment of its witnesses. But he insists that this was really the fault of the witnesses, who "provoked" Committee members to the use of controversial methods. He writes,
The Committee hears, by and large, a type of witness completely foreign to other
Congressional committees in search of information. More often than not it is faced
with subversives and fellow travelers who are superbly well trained and well advised
in the incitement of public sentiment. The reactions of some members of the Committee to their type of testimony have been provoked very artfully.32
There has been more controversy over the right of witnesses before the
Committee to enjoy the assistance of counsel than over any other single
procedural issue. While there were moments when the Committee seemed
to be dose to denying a witness the right to counsel completely, 33 it was
generally willing to allow a witness to be accompanied by counsel if he
insisted upon it. But it extended this right very grudgingly in many instances, it frequently cast reflections upon witnesses because of their insistence upon enjoyment of the right, it attempted to discredit particular
attorneys appearing before it, and it confined counsel to the narrow role
34
of advising a client only with respect to his constitutional rights.
The Committee's general irritation with witnesses who insist upon being
3' Communist Espionage Hearings 13 io.
32

Stripling, The Red Plot Against America 16o (1949).

331n 1945, during the examination of Jacob A. Stachel in the Communist Party Hearings,
Chairman Wood stated: "The policy of this Committee, with all due regard, is never to recognize counsel in these hearings." Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the
United States Communist Party, 79th Cong. ist Sess. 36 (i945). At other times, witnesses
were not allowed to bring lawyers into the Committee room, but were allowed to go out and
consult counsel about answers to questions involving legal matters. Investigation of UnAmerican Propaganda Activities in the United States: Executive Board, Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. i, 27 (1946) (cited hereafter as Joint Anti-Fascist

Refugee Committee Hearings).
34 Hearings Regarding Hans Eisler, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. 2, 3 (1947).
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accompanied by counsel has been many times indicated. When, for example, Alger Hiss in his fourth appearance before the Committee was, for
the first time, accompanied by counsel, there was an unmistakable undertone of displeasure on the part of Committee members that the witness
should have availed himself of this privilege. While Hiss was testifying,
"an unknown person" conferred with Hiss' counsel, and Chairman
Thomas abruptly interrupted the proceedings and demanded identification of this person. 35 When Thomas was quizzing Hiss as to whether he
should or should not have been able to recognize a photograph of Whittaker Chambers at an earlier hearing, Hiss' lawyer tried to break into the
exchange of remarks and was bluntly told by Thomas, "Never mind, you
keep quiet."36 Another time he was silenced by Mundt who said, "I object, Mr. Chairman. I want Mr. Hiss to finish his statement without any
interruption by counsel. You may speak afterwards." 37 Earlier during the
communist espionage hearings, Mundt congratulated Lauchlin Currie for
having appeared before the Committee without counsel. He said, "I
would like to have the record show that Mr. Currie, in addition to having
answered questions in a forthright manner, came here without benefit of
counsel to whisper in his ear the answers he should give to the committee.
I think that is very commendable." 35
The Committee has also upon a number of occasions shown considerable
interest in the private negotiations between a witness and his counsel and
has not hesitated to encroach upon what is generally recognized, in judicial procedure at least, to be a confidential relationship. For example,
both Mundt and H6bert showed great interest in Henry Wadieigh's dealings with his counsel. Wadleigh appeared before the Committee without
counsel, stating, in response to a question, that by mutual agreement he
and his counsel had parted company that morning. Mundt and H6bert
were both interested in finding out how Wadleigh had first engaged his
39
attorney and why he had later decided to dispense with his services.
During the Hollywood hearings the Committee frequently indicated its
3sCommunist Espionage Hearings 1082-83.
36 Ibid., at 1143.

37 Ibid., at ix6i.
38 Ibid., at 875. For other interesting examples of situations where the role of counsel was
limited to advice on constitutional questions and not to advising on answers to specific questions consult Communist Espionage Hearings 842, 845, and Atomic Espionage Hearings 3-4.
In contrast note the treatment of Eric Johnston in the Hollywood hearings. Mr. Stripling was
very solicitous in pointing out the witness's right to have counsel (Paul McNutt) sit next to
him. Hearings Regarding the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry, 8oth
Cong. xst Sess. 304-5 (1947) (cited hereafter as Hollywood Hearings).
39Communist Espionage Hearings 1432, 1438, i4-45-
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displeasure with the role being played by counsel, particularly during the
appearance of the unfriendly witnesses upon the stand. At one point the
questioning of Albert Maltz was interrupted and Robert W. Kenny, who
with Bartley Crum had appeared with Maltz as his counsel, was suddenly
called to the stand and sworn. The Committee then proceeded to question him at some length concerning an article that had appeared in the
Washington Times-Herald the same day to the effect that Kenny was
advising all of thq unfriendly witnesses to refuse to say whether they were
members of the Communist Party. Kenny refused to say whether he had
advised his clients not to answer the question concerning Party membership, pleading that the Committee was encroaching upon the privacy of
the client-counsel relationship. Thereupon, Thomas proceeded to read
Kenny the federal conspiracy act, implying that Kenny and his clients
might have committed a criminal offense if they had deliberately agreed
that the latter as witnesses should place themselves in contempt of the
Committee by refusing to answer its questions.4o
Perhaps the most serious conflict between the Committee and its witnesses over the issue of counsel took place during the communist espionage
hearings in 1948 when the Committee was hearing William Rosen and his
wife. Chambers had accused Hiss of having disposed of a 1929 Ford roadster by giving it to a member of the Communist Party, instead of lending
or giving it to Chambers as claimed by Hiss. Committee investigators
discovered from the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles in the
District of Columbia that Hiss had transferred title to the car to the Cherner Motor Company in July 1936, and that on the same day the Company had transferred title to a William Rosen. As a witness before the
Committee, Rosen refused to answer all significant questions on the
ground of self-incrimination. The hearing was an acrimonious one and Rosen's counsel, Maurice Braverman, interrupted the questioning a number
of times. Finally, Stripling demanded that Braverman be sworn so that
the Committee could question him. Braverman refused to be sworn, on
the grounds that as Rosen's counsel it was improper for the Committee to
40 Hollywood Hearings 367 et seq. Kenny ultimately took the position that the newspaper
article was not entirely accurate. Thereupon, the following exchange took place between
Thomas and Kenny (at 369):
"The Chairman. I will tell you, Mr. Kenny, as chairman, I want to let you know that you
squirmed out of this one temporarily, but if the committee should determine that is a violation
of this Conspiracy Act, then the committee will take it under consideration referring the matter
to the United States attorney.
"Mr. Kenny. That is right, Mr. Thomas. I might say that the committee has squirmed out
of one too, because I am sure that committee did not intend to invade the sacred province of
relationship between attorney and client.
"T1he Chairman. Oh, no; and neither would you want to commit conspiracy."
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seek to turn him into a witness, and also that he was entitled to obtain
his own counsel if he were going to appear as witness.4' In the face of this
resistance by Braverman the Committee backed down. But a little later
when Mrs. Rosen was on the stand much the same situation developed

again:
Mrs. Rosen. I refuse to answer this question on the ground that any answer I give
may tend to incriminate me.
The Chairman. I am getting pretty sick of this refusing to answer questions on the
ground that it might incriminate you, when some of the questions haven't got anything to do with whether or not this person is a member of the Communist Party. You
will have to be more responsive.

Mr. Stripling. Mr. Chairman, perhaps counsel can explain to the committee why
the witness is answering in this manner.
Mr. Braverman. Are you asking me?
Mr. Stripling. Yes.
Mr. Braverman. I merely advised my client as to what I think are her constitutional
rights.
Mr. Stripling. Will you tell the committee why answering whether or not she is a
member of the Communist Party will incriminate her?
Mr. Braverman. I feel I have a right to advise my client to the best of my ability,
Mr. Stripling.
Mr. Braverman. Mr. Stripling, I can only repeat I have a right to advise my client
to the very best of my ability.
Mr. Stripling. And that is your answer?
Mr. Braverman. That is my answer.
Mr. Stripling. And you intend to appear here with further witnesses?
Mr. Braverman. As long as I have the right to practice law and unless I am barred
by this committee. I don't know on what grounds that could be.
Mr. Stripling. I think counsel coming before this committee should come here in
good faith, and I think the committee should now consider whether you are here in
good faith.
*Mr.Braverman. I believe I am here in good faith.
The Chairman [Thomas]. Mr. Counsel, will you stand and be sworn? Please stand
and be sworn, because we want to ask some questions about this matter and it is very
important and we want sworn testimony.
Mr. Braverman. Mr. Thomas, I will state as I stated before, that I am not here as
a witness. I am here as counsel.
The Chairman. From now on you are here as a witness.
Mr. Braverman. Before I appear as a witness I would like the privilege of consulting
counsel and being represented by counsel before this committee.
The Chairman. Is your counsel present now?
Mr. Braverman. No.
41 Communist
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The Chairman. Do you refuse to be sworn?
Mr. Braverman. I refuse to be sworn and appear as a witness until I have the right
of counsel. I want counsel present to advise me.
The Chairman. I will have to insist that you be sworn now. Raise your right hand
or I will hold you in contempt.
Mr. Braverman. I am sorry, I do not want to be in contempt of this committee, but
if I am sworn as a witness I want the right to consult counsel.
The Chairman. We want to ask you two or three simple little questions and we
think the testimony should be sworn testimony, so if you will just please oblige the
committee by raising your right handMr. Braverman. If this committee will allow me the right to have counsel present
when I am here as a witness, I will be happy to be sworn as a witness.
Mr. Stripling. The witness has just given the committee a dissertation of his familiarity with the rights and privileges of witnesses. I don't think he needs counsel.
The Chairman. Do you have questions you want to ask him?
Mr. Stripling. Yes.
The Chairman. I think it should be sworn testimony.
Mr. Stripling. I do, too.
Mr. Braverman. Mr. Thomas, I can repeat I have a right to be represented by
counsel, if I appear here as a witness. I have not been subpoenaed. I appear here as
counsel.
The Chairman. The rights you have are the rights given you by this committee.
We will determine what rights you have and what rights you have not got before the
committee. I insist you be sworn at the present time. So please raise your right hand. 42
In spite of this threatening language by Thomas, Braverman still refused
to be sworn and once more the Committee backed down. However, it now
proceeded to subpoena Braverman in the usual manner and on the next
day he appeared as a witness accompanied by his own counsel. Braverman
was then asked point-blank whether he was a member of the Communist
Party and whether he had been put in touch with Rosen through the
Party. Braverman refused to answer these questions, on the grounds that
they encroached improperly upon the client-attorney relationship, and
4
also encroached upon his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. 3
During the 1949 hearings regarding communism in the District of Columbia, Representative Velde, in a seeming effort to discredit a witness's
counsel, went so far as to imply that Clifford Durr, who represented the
witness, John Anderson, as counsel, had perhaps earlier used his post as a
member of the Federal Communications Commission to render an impropat r3o8-io.
at 1342-46. For other instances of Committee efforts to discredit particular attorneys appearing before it consult Hearings Regarding Hans Eisler, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. z58
(1947); and Hearings Regarding Communism in Labor Unions in the United States, 8oth
Cong. ist Sess. zog, X22, 123 (r947) (cited hereafter as Labor Unions Hearings).
42Ibid.,

43 Ibid.,
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er favor to a business enterprise in which the witness was interested. 44
In the Committee's defense it may be said that in many of the instances
where it came into conflict with counsel there was some reason to believe
that attorneys representing witnesses were themselves members of the
Communist Party, or were ready and able to help Communists utilize the
self-incrimination ground as a means of avoiding testimony. But this was
obviously not true in all such situations, and in any case it is exceedingly
doubtful whether the Committee had sufficient provocation to concern
itself with counsel to the extent that it did. In refusing to testify on the
ground of self-incrimination or on other grounds, witnesses were running
a considerable risk. As it turned out, in several hearings, notably the Hollywood one, numerous witnesses ultimately went to jail for their failure
to answer questions. This would seem to constitute a sufficient hazard for
a nonco-operative witness, without the necessity of threatening his attorney because of advice given a client. Thomas' action in bullying
Robert Kenny by reading him the text of the conspiracy act remains one
of the low points in the history of the Committee's procedures.
Attention should be given to the role that counsel has been permitted
to play during Committee sessions. In general, counsel has remained
silent and this is very much a part of the tradition of congressional investigations. Occasionally, counsel has tried to play the more active role
common to attorneys in judicial proceedings. For example, in the Hollywood hearings there occurred an interesting attempt to use the motion to
quash the proceedings. Three attorneys representing nineteen clients notified Chairman Thomas by wire that when the hearings opened on the first
day they would move to quash the subpoenas on the ground that the investigation constituted an unlawful attempt to "control the content of
motion pictures through censorship and political intimidation. ' 4 When
44 "Mr. Velde. How long have you known your attorney, Mr. Durr?
"Mr. Anderson. I have known Mr. Durr about a year, I guess.
"Mr. Velde. Did you know him at the time he got this stock in WQQW?
"Mr. Anderson. I didn't know Mr. Durr. If I had met Mr. Durr, I would not have known
who he was. I knew there was a Mr. Durr, but I didn't know him.
"Mr. Velde. Did you know he was on the Federal Communications Commission at that

time?
"Mr. Anderson. I saw his name as a Government official from time to time.
"Mr. Velde. Do you know if he assisted in getting a license for Station WQQW?
"Mr. Anderson. I don't know that.
"Mr. Duff. Congressman, if you want to go into the question of my connection with
Station WQQW, I will be glad to appear before this committee atany time.
"Mr. Velde. That is up to the committee. That is all."
Hearings regarding communism in the District of Columbia, 8ist Cong. ist Sess. 713
(1949) (cited hereafter as District of Columbia Hearings).
4sN.Y. Herald Tribune § i, p. i, col. 6 (Oct. 6, 1947).
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the hearings opened, Thomas refused to let Kenny or Crum argue their
motion orally, but the Committee did accept a written brief. When the
first unfriendly witness, John Howard Lawson, was heard a week later,
Kenny renewed his efforts and the Committee in effect allowed him to
make a short oral argument and to present "two additional evidences" of
the illegality of the proceedings based upon the proceedings of the previous week, namely that the Committee was trying to dictate to producers
the content of films, and to induce them to maintain a blacklist. Kenny
asserted "both of these ... indicate an unconstitutional purpose ... to
invade the domain protected by the first amendment ....-41 Upon hearing this oral argument Chairman Thomas announced that the Committee
would go into executive session to consider the issue. It did so, and reconvened shortly, at which time the Chairman announced "the decision
on the brief" in the following words:
No committee of Congress has the right to establish its own legality or constitutionality. A committee of Congress cannot disqualify itself from the provisions of the
law. We operate under Public Law 6oi. We cannot set aside this law to suit the convenience of certain witnesses or their counsel. As a former attorney general of California you certainly know that your remedy, if any, is in the courts.47
From time to time attorneys appearing before the Committee have
asked for permission to question their clients or to cross-examine other
witnesses, but invariably these requests have been denied. 45 During the
communist espionage hearings the lawyer representing a witness, Alexander Koral, was in effect allowed to enter objections to one or two questions
asked his client, but these objections were overruled, and Chairman
Thomas soon put a stop to the procedure, insisting that counsel had no
right to enter objections.49
46 Hollywood Hearings 288. In the written brief it was argued that the Un-American Activities Committee was illegal and unconstitutional "both in the manner in which the authority
given to it by the Congress has been executed, and by the terms of that authority itself."
47 Hollywood Hearings 289. During the Hollywood hearings, Paul V. McNutt as counsel
for the Motion Picture Association asked for, and was given, permission to read a statement
protesting statements made by Chairman Thomas while Eric Johnston, President of the
MPAA, was testifying before the Committee, that Johnston or his assistants had brought
pressure on the Committee to call off or postpone the Hollywood hearings. Ibid., at 36o-63.
48For example, during the Hollywood hearings when John Howard Lawson was called as a
witness, his attorney, Bartley Crum, requested the right of cross-examination and asked the
Committee to call back some ten witnesses who had testified during the first week of hearings
so that they might be cross-examined. Thomas immediately denied the request. Hollywood
Hearings 289.
49Communist Espionage Hearings 704-I. Thomas was characteristically rude in silencing
Koral's attorney. The record bristles with such phrases as "You keep quiet a few seconds.'!
"You will please be quiet." "I just want you to be quiet." Granted that the attorney was seek-
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In the final analysis, an attorney representing a witness before the
Un-American Activities Committee can do virtually nothing for him beyond advising him what his chances are of avoiding a successful prosecution for contempt if he refuses to answer certain questions put to him. It
should be repeated again that virtually the same statement can be made
about attorneys and witnesses appearing before any congressional committee. But because the Un-American Activities Committee has personalized its hearings to a degree that has seldom been reached by other
committees of Congress the inability of counsel to render to a witness the
kind of assistance he could give, were his client a defendant in a court
trial, becomes a serious matter.
There has been much argument through the years over the right of
witnesses before the Un-American Activities Committee to make prepared statements. The Committee has never recognized a general right
on the part of witnesses to make oral statements. On the other hand, the
Committee has usually been willing to receive from a witness and place
in the record a written statement, provided the substance of the statement is regarded as pertinent to the matter under investigation, and provided the witness has co-operated with the Committee by answering its
questions, or has not otherwise irritated or angered it. This policy was
illustrated during the 79 th Congress when the Committee heard Gerald
L. K. Smith in January 1946. Smith asked to submit a rather long statement to which he had given the flamboyant title, "A Petition for Redress
of Grievances and for an Investigation into Promoted Terrorism, Denial
of Civil Liberty, Conspiracy against Freedom, Organized Character Assassination, Corrupt Practice, Organized Rioting, Etc." It was accepted
for printing in the published volume of the hearing. This, however, did
not satisfy Representative Rankin who insisted that he wanted to hear
the statement. The Chairman (Wood) refused to deviate from the rule
allowing only written statements. However, after continued insistence by
Thomas and Rankin, before the hearing was over Smith was allowed to
read long sections of it.so
At the first public hearing conducted by the Committee during the
8oth Congress Chairman Thomas told the witness (Gerhart Eisler): "It is
ing to play a role seldom if ever permitted attorneys representing witnesses before congressional committees, Thomas, here as elsewhere, seemed unable to control the proceedings in a
manner befitting the dignity and tradition of an agency of the Congress of the United States.
so Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States (Gerald L. K.
Smith), 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 23-24, 33 et seq. (1946) (cited hereafter as Gerald L. K. Smith
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not the policy of this committee to permit witnesses to make a statement.
After you have completed your testimony, if you desire to make a statement, the committee will permit you to put it in the record at the conclusion of your testimony."'' 5 Thereafter, Eisler refused to be sworn by the
Committee. As a result he gave no testimony and the Committee did not
receive his statement, although it was apparently distributed to newsmen
52
in the Committee room by his attorney.
There have been many exceptions to the general policy outlined in the
preceding paragraph. During the Hollywood hearing in i947, the Committee vacillated greatly with respect to the making of statements. Many
of the friendly witnesses had no statements. Those who did, such as Sam
Warner and Louis Mayer, were usually permitted to read their statements
at the beginning of their testimony.53 Paul McNutt and Eric Johnston
s5 Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States: Hearings on
Gerhart Eisler, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. 2 (1947) (cited hereafter as Gerhart Eisler Hearings).
s2 Ibid., at 4. Another example of the Committee's practice in 1947 with respect to statements is seen in the following exchange of remarks which took place during the hearings concerning communism in labor unions (Labor Union Hearings 116-17).
"Mr. Stripling. I have questions I want to ask him, but he has asked permission to make a
statement. I was going to ask him if his statement is in written form.
"Mr. McCrea. Yes, sir; it is.
"Mr. Stripling. Would you care to submit it to the chairman first? The procedure of the
committee, Mr. McCrea, is to ask questions, then if the witness has a statement the committee will consider having him read it.
"(The statement referred to was handed to the chairman.)
"Mr. Stripling. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the witness be permitted to read the statement.
"The Chairman. Any objection?
"(No response.)
"The Chairman. All right, Mr. McCrea; you may read the statement.
"Mr. Stripling. Mr. McCrea"Mr. Nixon. May I ask a question?
"The Chairman. Mr. Nixon.
"Mr. Nixon. The copies of the statement are already in the hands of the committee, and I
think, for the record, that we should have an understanding as to the procedure; the statement
is in order because it relates to the facts which have been brought out in this investigation, and
it is an attempt by the witness to refute those facts. That is the reason that it is being read.
"The Chairman. The Chair agrees.
"Mr. Stripling. Is your statement the same as this press release which was distributed this
morning?
"Mr. McCrea. Yes.
"Mr. Bonner. I would like to ask one question before the statement is read. Mr. McCrea, I
am in favor of your reading the statement. After you read the statement, are you going to
submit yourself to questions about this matter?
"Mr. McCrea. Yes; I would be glad to.
"The Chairman. All right; proceed."

s3 Hollywood Hearings 9, 70. Roy Brewer, a friendly witness who testified concerning the
communist influence in Hollywood labor unions, was told at the beginning of his testimony
that everything in his statement could be substantiated through questioning. However, at
the end of his testimony he was permitted to read the statement. Ibid., at 342, 356.
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were permitted to read statements highly critical of the Committee at the
54
beginning of their testimony.
When it came time to hear the ten unfriendly witnesses the Committee
was seemingly unable to decide upon and follow any consistent policy.
Each of the ten men had a prepared statement which he asked permission
to read as soon as he took the witness chair. It may be presumed that all
of the statements were highly critical of the Committee and contained
vigorous language. In each instance the Chairman asked to see the statement and a cursory examination of it was made by him and other Committee members before he ruled on the witness's request. The first of the
unfriendly witnesses, John Howard Lawson, was denied permission to
read his statement. After a brief examination of it Thomas stated, "I
don't care to read any more of the statement. The statement will not be
read. I read the first line.... I refuse you [sic] to make the statement,
because of the first sentence in your statement. That statement is not
pertinent to the inquiry."Ss Dalton Trumbo, the second of the unfriendly
witnesses, was similarly treated. However, with Albert Maltz, the third
witness, the Committee suddenly reversed its policy and permitted him
to read his full statement at the beginning of his testimony, even though
it was bitterly anti-Committee s6 Maltz was followed by Alvah Bessie who
was permitted to read the opening and dosing paragraphs of his statement, the remainder being received and incorporated in the printed record
of the hearings.57 Having made this generous gesture to two of the unfriendly witnesses, the Committee once more about-faced and the next
four witnesses were all refused permission to read or submit their statements, the refusal being justified in each instance because the statement
contained "vilification" or was not pertinent to the inquiry. The next-tothe-last of this group of witnesses, Ring Lardner, Jr., was told he could
read his statement after the completion of his testimony, but he promptly
got into the same squabble with the Committee over refusal to answer the
question as to membership in the Communist Party as had his colleagues,
and he was dismissed from the stand without further reference to the
statement.,' The last member of the group, Lester Cole, was denied permission to read or submit his statement.
During the communist espionage hearings in 1948 the Committee
6
at 3o5, 360.
s Ibid., at 364.
57 Ibid., at 383.
ssIbid., at 290.
s8 Ibid., at 480 et seq. Thomas indulged in some rather childish bargaining with Larduer.
When the latter began to balk at answering the Committee's questions, Thomas said: "Now,
Mr. Lardner, don't do like the others, if I were you [sic], or you will never read your statement. I would suggest... ." Ibid., at 480.

54Ibid.,
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adhered to a somewhat more consistent policy. Elizabeth Bentley, the first
witness, had no prepared statement, and submitted at once to questioning.
The second witness, Whittaker Chambers, had a statement which he was
allowed to read almost immediately after he took the witness chair s9 The
third witness was Nathan Gregory Silvermaster who had been named by
Miss Bentley as the leader of a group of communist espionage agents in
the federal government. Upon being sworn, Silvermaster immediately
asked for permission to read a statement. The statement was received and
examined by the Committee and it appeared that Stripling and Rankin
had objections to parts of it, although Mundt, who was acting as chairman, announced it might be read "at the proper time."6 ° Almost immediately, however, Stripling informed the chairman that he would like to
have the witness read his statement and this was done. In the course of
this rather brief statement, Silvermaster said: "The charges made by Miss
Bentley are false and fantastic. I can only conclude that she is a neurotic
liar."' 6' Thereafter, Silvermaster refused to answer most of the questions
put to him, including one as to whether he had ever known Miss Bentley,
on the ground of self-incrimination. Representative Nixon in very telling
fashion then proceeded to tax the witness concerning an inconsistency
between his calling Miss Bentley's charges "false and fantastic" and his
refusal to say whether he knew Miss Bentley or to say whether her specific
charge that he had maintained a photographic laboratory in his home
was true or not. 62 It may well be that Stripling and Nixon saw the advantage of letting Silvermaster read his statement at an early stage in the
hearing because of its flat repudiation of the Bentley charges, and in effect
set a trap for him, knowing that he was going to refuse to answer specific
questions on the ground of self-incrimination. In any case, this episode
showed the advantage from the Committee's own point of view of first
letting a witness read a prepared statement and then subjecting him to
questioning over the ground covered in the statement. Had this same technique been used during the Hollywood hearings it is entirely possible that,
by allowing the unfriendly witnesses to read their statements when they
first took the witness stand, a basis would have been laid for questions
which the witnesses would have found it difficult not to answer, or which,
if not answered, would have placed them in a less enviable light than they
actually occupied.
In the espionage hearings this technique was used effectively on William
Ullmann and Abraham Silverman. Both made more or less categorical
s9 Communist Espionage Hearings 564.
6
oIbid., at 587.

6

1Ibid., at 59o.
Ibid., at 594, 604.
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denials of the Bentley charges in their prepared statements, but both refused to answer questions as to the truth or falsity of specific charges
made by Miss Bentley, on the ground that they might incriminate themselves in replying. 63 Virtually all of the other witnesses who testified during the espionage hearings who wished to read prepared statements were
permitted to do so, either immediately upon taking the witness chair, or
shortly thereafter.64 A notable exception occurred on August 25 when the
public confrontation between Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers took
place. Soon after taking the stand in the morning Hiss asked to be allowed
to read a statement. Thomas rather petulantly inquired whether the statement was the same as a letter which Hiss had sent to Thomas and had also
released to the press. Stripling then advised Thomas to defer the reading
of the statement. Hiss renewed his request several times, but it was not
until the end of a long day's session, after Hiss had been subjected to prolonged and searching questioning, and after Nixon and Mundt had both
made long statements of their own, summarizing the Hiss-Chambers case
to date and drawing conclusions from the evidence submitted up to that
point, that Hiss was allowed to read his statement.15 This petty treatment
of Hiss was certainly not fair under the circumstances. What is more important is that the statement, if introduced early in the day, might well
have provided a basis for more intelligent questioning. In view of the
spectacular developments in the Hiss-Chambers case that were to come
months later, there is always the possibility that a different line of questioning might have resulted in an earlier denouement in the case. In his
statement, Hiss challenged the Committee to explore his record as a public officer carefully for evidence of wrongdoing. The failure of the Committee ever to do this in systematic fashion remains a weakness in its
handling of the case. In this statement Hiss also asked permission to have
certain questions put to Chambers. This permission was granted, but,
perhaps because this development took place toward the end of a long
and tiring day, Chambers was not pressed very hard to give full answers
to some of the questions.66
63Ibid., at 774, 844.
6

4In addition to those already mentioned, prepared statements were read by Alger Hiss,
Communist Espionage Hearings 642; Victor Perlo, ibid., at 699; Duncan Lee, ibid., at 723;
Henry Collins, ibid., at 805; Lauchlin Currie, ibid., at 852; Harry White, ibid., at 878; Bela
Gold, ibid., at 9o7; Sonia Gold, ibid., at 913; Frank Coe, ibid., at 916; and Donald Hiss,
ibid., at 928.
6s Ibid., at 1077, 1124, 1126, ii47, I149, 1157,

ri6o.

66 For example, one of the questions asked Chambers for a full bibliography of all his writings under every name he had used. Virtually no effort was made to get Chambers to answer
this question, which was surely a significant one. Ibid., at 1177, i88. Nixon, who was putting
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In 1949 during the course of the hearings concerning communism in the
District of Columbia the Committee reverted to its earlier policy of not
permitting the making of statements by witnesses who otherwise fail to
co-operate with the Committee. For example, Rose Anderson was denied
permission to make a statement because she had "not condescended to
67
answer any of [the Committee's] questions.1
The record which the Un-American Activities Committee has made
since 1945 in squabbling with numerous witnesses over the making of
prepared statements is outstanding for its futility. It may be granted that
virtually all of the statements that were not allowed to be made were
marked by vilification and distortion. Nonetheless, in refusing permission
to certain witnesses to make such statements the Committee allowed itself
to be drawn down to the level set by the truculent witnesses and opened
itself to ,the charge of unfair treatment of them. In almost every instance
banned statements were released to the press, and while they were seldom
carried in full by many papers their content was certainly not effectively
suppressed by the Committee's action in refusing to allow them to be read
or received for the record. Moreover, it is difficult to see what possible
harm could have been done in any instance by allowing a statement to be
read publicly and placed in the printed record. At the worst, Committee
members might have had to listen to outbursts of bombast and propaganda, but they could have done so in the knowledge that witnesses who
resorted to extreme language in their statements were thereby condemning
themselves far more effectively than the Committee itself could do. At
best, the reading of the statements might have provided a basis for telling
questioning of a witness, as was true in the cases of Silvermaster, Ullmann,
and Silverman during the communist espionage hearings.
The Un-American Activities Committee has never recognized in any
formal sense the right of cross-examination. In refusing to recognize this
right the Committee has had the precedents on its side so far as the practice of congressional investigating committees is concerned. Nonetheless,
the issue continues to be raised from time to time. During the Hollywood
hearings, it came up repeatedly. At the very beginning of the hearings,
Bartley Crum claimed the right for his clients and was flatly refused.68 A
few minutes later Paul McNutt got a more definitive ruling on the same
the questions to Chambers stated that Chambers should submit such a bibliography to the
Committee at a later date, but there is no evidence that he ever did so, and if he did submit a
list of his writings it was never made public.
67District of Columbia Hearings 698.
69Hollywood Hearings 4.
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point when he was told that "[i]t is not the policy of the committee to permit counsel to cross-examine witnesses. You will only have the right, the
solemn right, to advise your client, the witness, on his constitutional
rights. Nothing else." 6 9
On the second day of the hearings, while John Moffitt, motion picture
critic for Esquire magazine, was testifying, a "Mr. Katz," who announced
that he represented a number of persons who had been subpoenaed, interrupted the proceedings, asked for permission to cross-examine Moffitt,
and was ejected from the room.70 Again at the beginning of the second
week of hearings, Robert Kenny asked permission to recall a number of
witnesses for cross-examination, and the request was abruptly denied.7'
During the communist espionage hearings the following year, an interesting exchange of remarks took place between the Committee and one
of its witnesses on the subject of cross-examination. The witness was
Frank Coe, who had been named by Elizabeth Bentley as a member of
one of the communist groups in the federal service with which she said
she had been in touch as a communist courier. Coe denied all of Miss
Bentley's charges against him, and answered all questions put to him by
the Committee. In his prepared statement which he was allowed to read,
he requested the right to cross-examine Miss Bentley and said:
I understand that this committee has previously decided against using such procedures on the ground that, though they may be incumbent on a court, they are not
desirable for a legislative committee. It seems to me, however, that this committee
does in fact function as a criminal court. Before this committee there are accusers and
accused, just as in a court. The accused are punished. The grave and sensational
charges which are made here are given wide publicity and that is a cruel punishment.
It hurts the accused, his family, and his friends and associates.
The peculiarity of this court is that all who are accused before it are punished-the
innocent and the guilty alike. Under the present methods of the committee, that
result is inevitable. As the committee knows, these views are held by many people. I
hope they will be given consideration.72
A little later Coe renewed his request, and Mundt, who was acting as
chairman, replied:
The position of this committee has been-and you explained it very clearly in your
statement-that we are not functioning as a court, don't have the power, unfortunately, that a court does have, and so we have not made it a policy to cross-examine
witnesses or to permit counsel to do so.
Had we the full authority of a court, certainly it would be easier to get down into
the disputed evidence in this particular case. Since we do not have, we cannot adapt
69Ibid., at 7.
70Ibid., at i8-i9.

-,Ibid., at 289.
72Communist Espionage Hearings 916-i7.
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ourselves to part of the rules of the court without having the authority that goes with
being a court. Unfortunately, we cannot accept your request.73

Thereupon Coe asked permission to read the questions he would have
asked Miss Bentley had he been permitted to cross-examine her. At first,
Mundt seemed inclined to grant this permission. But Stripling protested
that such a procedure had never been followed by a congressional committee, and that granting the permission requested would establish a
precedent. Thereupon, the Committee went into one of its characteristic
"ornery" spells and refused even to let Coe make a further statement incorporating what he said were the correct factual answers to the questions he would have put to Miss Bentley. He was told he had already made
one statement, that if he wanted to add to that statement he would first
have to put it in writing, and finally Mundt stated that the Committee
could not "stay here for stump speeches by anybody." 7 4 As has already
been indicated, the Committee did later permit Alger Hiss to submit a
list of formal questions which it then proceeded to put to Whittaker
Chambers, although whether the Committee pressed for adequate answers
is debatable.
Closely related to the right to cross-examination is the right to reply
to adverse testimony given by other witnesses. Controversy over this
latter right has been chronic in connection with the investigations of the
Un-American Activities Committee because of its pronounced tendency
through the years to allow certain of its witnesses great freedom in bringing the names of other persons into their testimony. The issue is really a
double one: What can or should be done to prevent witnesses from naming
other persons in a derogatory context and what right should persons so
named have to reply?
The issue in both of its aspects presented itself during the first month
of the Dies Committee's existence in 1938. At the first hearing of his committee, Dies announced that it would not permit "character assassination" or the "smearing of innocent people" by witnesses.7 s However, before the end of the month, Dies had somewhat revised his stand and was
saying that voluntary witnesses would be allowed greater freedom in their
testimony than would subpoenaed witnesses. Under this policy, before
the year was out the Committee had settled into the habit of letting voluntary witnesses ramble in irresponsible fashion, making only perfunctory
efforts to check the data submitted by them or to subject them to intelli73 Ibid.,

at 9"26.

74 Ibid.,

at

927.

75 Ogden,

The Dies Committee 51 (1943).
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gent cross-examination.76 So many "innocent people" were named by witnesses that any possibility of reply on their part became mechanically
impossible, even if the Committee had shown interest in hearing such
people, which it did not.
In no year since its creation in 1945 has the permanent Committee had
a clean record in preventing witnesses from indulging in the irresponsible
naming of other persons. Indeed, there is hardly a hearing in the six-year
period covered by this study in which there are not to be found shocking
instances of "character assassination."77 In particular, there are numerous
instances of a failure on the part of the Committee to honor the "right of
reply." A flagrant example is found in the Hollywood hearings. One of
the charges against the motion picture industry widely publicized by the
Committee, even in advance of the hearings in Washington in October
1947, was that the Roosevelt Administration had brought improper pressure upon the industry to make pro-Soviet films. In particular, the charge
was developed that Lowell Mellett used his authority as a high OW1 official to compel Robert Taylor to play a part against his will in the film
Song of Russia.7 8 Mellett denied this charge and repeatedly requested the
Committee to grant him a hearing. Mellett was particularly bitter when
the Committee adjourned its Hollywood hearings without letting him
testify, and asserted, "The committee deliberately avoided letting me
'7 9
give them the truth.
Perhaps the most vigorous attempt during the life of the Committee
to curb irresponsible testimony and to guarantee a right of reply was
made by Representative H~bert in 1948 during the Communist espionage
hearings. While the first witness, Elizabeth Bentley, was testifying H~bert
insisted that the persons whom she named should have a public hearing.8 "
H~bert was not remarkably successful in his efforts to protect people by
76 Ibid., at 58, 62.
77 This assertion is easily documented as any careful reader of the Committee's printed
hearings will quickly discover. Strong as is the temptation to provide a definitive and systematic list of examples, the author is deterred from doing so by the desire not to give any further
publicity to the people whose names have been so used.
78 N.Y.
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8o"If anybody put in jeopardy an individual who is charged with being a Communist, I

think, in fairness, that this individual should be allowed his day in court here in public hearing
as well. Now, if you were in secret session or in executive session, and these names were used,
then we owe them no obligation, but the minute that we allow a witness on the stand to mention any individual, that individual has a right to come before this committee and have his
day in court, and every man or woman mentioned here this morning has a right to be subpenaed to come here." Communist Espionage Hearings 537.
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preventing their names from being mentioned in public sessions. The Committee's two star witnesses, Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers,
were given a free rein and were permitted to name persons without restraint and seemingly without any previous checking. Indeed, at times
they were even encouraged by Committee members or investigators to
drag in additional names.' On the other hand, the Committee did apparently allow every person named by Bentley or Chambers to appear
before the Committee and deny the charges, if he wished to do so. In fact,
the Committee itself subpoenaed a number of these persons, only to have
many of them refuse to confirm or deny the charges, on the ground of
self-incrimination. 82
The generally equivocal attitude of the Committee on this issue of the

right of reply was never made dearer than in the following statement in
the Committee's Interim Report of August 28, 1948, on the communist
espionage hearings:
It is the established policy of this committee to protect in every feasible manner

the reputations and the sensibilities of innocent citizens. It is also an established fact
that in conducting public hearings-and this committee deplores the use of star-cham-

ber, secret sessions unless public necessity requires them-an occasional mention of
some innocent citizen in connection with a nefarious practice will inevitably occur.
When it does, we provide every opportunity for those mentioned to clear themselves
of all suspicion in the same forum before the same publicity media as in the case of the
original allegations. In addition we have frequently inserted memoranda in our files
to protect those innocently accused elsewhere from unjust attack or suspicion.
At times, however, your committee is confronted with the necessity of running the
risk that a few innocent people may be temporarily embarrassed or the risk that
140,000,000 innocent Americans may be permanently enslaved. When necessary to
resolve the relative merits of two such risks as that, your committee holds to the position that its primary responsibility is to that great bulk of our American population
whose patriotic devotion to our free institutions deserves the greatest diligence in being
protected against those who would utilize our Bill of Rights and our American freedoms
to destroy permanently these great safeguards of personal liberty and human dignity.83

During the second phase of the communist espionage hearings in December 1948, H6bert again became concerned about preventing the
naming of additional persons by witnesses; and the Committee made a
pretense of following the policy of going into executive session to hear
11Ibid., at 575, 576, 1474.
There were a number of persons named by Bentley or Chambers who were not subpoenaed and did not appear as voluntary witnesses. Whether anyone in this category made an
effort to be heard and was denied an opportunity to testify by the Committee is not clear
from the record. It seems likely that every person who made an active effort to be heard was
granted a hearing.
8Interim Report 3.
82
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such names. 4 For example, during the questioning of Isaac Don Levine
on the evening of December 8, Mr. H~bert expressed concern over the
projection of new names into the hearings. Mr. Mundt suggested that
Mr. Levine write on slips of paper any names which previously had not
appeared in the record. These slips of paper were to be given to the investigator for submission to the Committee. However, Mr. H6bert was not
satisfied with this solution and stated that if any new names were to be
introduced, he would move for an executive session15 Subsequently, the
Committee did go into executive session to receive from Levine the names
of six additional persons, including that of Laurence Duggan, allegedly
named by Whittaker Chambers to Adolf Berle in 1939. How little meaning
this belated effort to protect such persons had was made clear two weeks
later when Representatives Mundt and Nixon took it upon themselves to
give out to the press within a matter of hours after Duggan's death the information that Levine had named him as a person accused by Chambers
of being a member of a communist group in the Government.
Many of the weaknesses which are so apparent in the record of the
Un-American Activities Committee are deep-seated and will not be easy
to correct. Nonetheless, if the un-American activities investigation is to
be continued there are certain organizational and procedural changes that
might be made in an effort to improve the record of such an undertaking.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss such a remedial program in
detail but two or three obvious points deserve to be made.
In the first place, attention might well be given to improving the personnel and organization of the Committee's staff. All authorities on Congress now recognize the importance of adequate professional staffing to
the successful operation of the legislature. Moreover, the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 194616 did take a long step toward making such
facilities available. The Un-American Activities Committee, along with
the other committees of Congress, now has substantial financial and legislative authority to build up a permanent secretariat of high professional
competence. In exercising this authority the Committee has made neither
the best nor the worst record among congressional committees. But without seeking to criticize the particular personnel or organization of its present staff, it is clear the Committee could do much better than it has done
84 The word "pretense" is used because in the questioning of at least one witness, Marion
Bachrach, during this period, the Committee itself brought the names of many persons not
hitherto identified with the espionage charges into the testimony.
ss Communist Espionage Hearings, i4oo-i.
6

8 6o Stat. 812 (1946).
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in this respect. And with a more able staff to service its operations it is
reasonable to expect that some of the weakness in program-planning, procedures, and techniques would at least be alleviated. Beyond that, further
improvement in the mechanics of the Committee's operations is probably
largely dependent upon certain general, Congress-wide reforms. Amendment of the Legislative Reorganization Act to subject all committees to
a greater measure of organizational and procedural control is highly desirable. The committees of Congress are still in too many ways irresponsible "little legislatures" which go their separate and erratic ways as the
whim of their chairmen or their members dictates. Similarly a solution
to the problem of the rights of witnesses before congressional committees
is in good part dependent upon the formulation of a code of fair procedures
that will govern the operations of all committees. Numerous proposals
for such a code have been made in the last two or three years,* but to
date neither House of Congress has shown much of an inclination to act
upon them. The problem is admittedly a more complex one than has been
generally recognized and many of the specific proposals for procedural reform have been ill-considered ones. Care must be taken not to place unnecessary and unworkable restraints upon the committees. But in spite
of the difficulty of evolving a satisfactory set of workable rules the time
has certainly come when Congress must face and meet this responsibility.
If it be true that the answer to the mistakes and abuses of the Un-American Activities Committee must and should be found in the national legislature itself, then further delay in the formulation and adoption by Congress of sound, sensible rules governing the organization and operation
of its committees endangers the continuing usefulness and vitality of the
investigating function--surely one of the most important functions of
Congress.
* Consult Galloway, Proposed Reforms, page 478 supra.

